Around 4 lakh voters to be denied voting opportunity?

Have you checked and ensured that your name is included? PG Bhat says that around 4,00,000 voters might be denied voting rights this time, while duplicated records will continue to exist on rolls.


Chief Electoral Officer of Karnataka (CEO-KA) has published the list of applications for inclusion in the electoral rolls, ahead of BBMP elections in Bengaluru. 3,66,640 of 4,65,377 applications are approved. However, a search for voter names (with relative names) as given in the list show that more than 99% of these names are not added to the voter list for the forthcoming BBMP elections. Either the citizens are not included as voters though their applications are shown approved or the names are entered differently from what is shown in the approved list.

Of 58,097 applications for deletion of names from voter lists, 44,730 are approved. However, sample checks with EPIC numbers show that none of these records is deleted.

Thus, with supporting data to infer from, I suspect that about 4,00,000 approved requests for registration are not included as voters in State Election Commission (SEC) rolls for the BBMP elections. They seem to be included in Chief Electoral Officer’s (CEO) rolls. SEC might have taken an older version of voter database from CEO, thus making new registrations irrelevant for the BBMP elections.

Where is the problem?

Here is an example that could help the authorities to find the cause of the problem. Also, they may find reason for just created duplicate records.

At list for claims for Mahadevapura constituency shows a claim at serial 32069: 11/03/2015, Kameshwari, N. Subramanian  (H), Application is Approved- Part No is 305.

At search with name shows one record with details matching with the claims status. EPIC# SVF7127467.

At search by EPIC# gives message “No Records Found in Electoral Roll.” This is the site to search voter records for BBMP elections.

Voter repository at CEO and SEC are not synchronised though the voters are same and the same people maintain the rolls for CEO and SEC both.

Strangely, search at  with EPIC# SVF7159478 gives a duplicate record for the voter. This shows that the system continues to create duplicate records regularly. Though the issue is repeatedly raised for the past several years, CEO has not taken remedial actions to correct the situation.

I think that the applications received during the registration drive were updated in CEO’s Electoral Roll Management System. SEC borrows dumps from CEO and then publishes them after changing part numbers by wards. This is what I understood based on my discussions with SEC a few months ago. DEOs and EROs are the same for CEO and SEC.

Out of this 4 lakh+ applications, there would be some fake applications. 11,370 applications were rejected between February 01st and 26 July 26th. Even when applications are genuine, CEO creates duplicate entries with bad software and callous attitude.

Today, on August 14th 2015, I checked at CEO website as well as BBMP website. Approved additions and deletions reflect when we query for voter data at CEO website, but not on BBMP website. So, we have a serious situation where registered eligible voters do not appear on the rolls and ineligible deleted voters continue to be in the rolls.

Top of CEO-KA website home page says National Electoral Roll Purification and Authentication Program. Slogans all.

Related Articles

Six reasons why Bengaluru’s voter roll lacks quality
Check if your name still exists on voter rolls!


  1. Arathi Manay Yajaman says:

    Searching by EPIC is the most reliable way. One reason for records not showing up is the spelling. I dont know how many times names are written fm English to Kannada to English to Kannada, with the result that the spellings get distorted.

  2. Shree D N says:

    ‘@Arathi – What about new registrations? They won’t have EPIC right?

  3. Arathi Manay Yajaman says:

    Yes Shree, w/o EPIC search is difficult if spellings are incorrect. New regns will just have to go to the booth and search by address.

  4. skeptic says:

    Nothing but electoral fraud – FYI, I have pasted some information from Wikipedia;

    Specific methods[edit]

    Electoral fraud can occur at any stage in the democratic process, but most commonly it occurs during election campaigns, voter registration or during vote-counting. The two main types of electoral fraud are (1) preventing eligible voters from casting their vote freely (or from voting at all), and (2) altering the results.[citation needed] A list of threats to voting systems, or electoral fraud methods, is kept by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.[2]
    Electorate manipulation[edit]

    Most electoral fraud takes place during or immediately after election campaigns, by interfering with the voting process or the counting of votes.[citation needed] However, it can also occur far in advance, by altering the composition of the electorate. In many cases this is not illegal and thus technically not electoral fraud, although it is a violation of the principles of democracy.[3]
    Manipulation of demography[edit]

    In many cases it is possible for authorities to artificially control the composition of an electorate in order to produce a foregone result. A famous example is Kuwait in the 1980s.[clarification needed] One way of doing this is to move a large number of voters into the electorate prior to an election, for example by temporarily assigning them land or lodging them in flophouses.[4][5] Many countries prevent this with rules stipulating that a voter must have lived in an electorate for a minimum period (for example, six months) in order to be eligible to vote there. However, such laws can themselves be used for demographic manipulation as they tend to disenfranchise those with no fixed address, such as the homeless, travelers, Roma, students (studying full-time away from home) and some casual workers.

    Another strategy is to permanently move people into an electorate, usually through public housing. If people eligible for public housing are likely to vote for a particular party, then they can either be concentrated into one electorate, thus making their votes count for less, or moved into marginal electorates, where they may tip the balance towards their preferred party. One notable example of this occurred in the City of Westminster under Shirley Porter.[6] In this case the electoral fraud relied on gaming the United Kingdom’s first past the post electoral system, as in such a system it does not matter how much a party wins or loses by. The fraudsters calculated which wards they had no hope of winning, which they were almost sure of winning and which wards were marginal. By manipulating Westminster Council’s public housing stock, the fraudsters were able to move voters more likely to vote for their electoral rivals from marginal wards to the wards that they were going to lose anyway. In the ensuing elections the Labour opposition could only win their safe seats, with the small Conservative leads in the marginal wards being enough for that party to win these wards, and therefore maintain their majority position and control of the council. In her defense, Porter raised the history of the provision of public housing in London and Herbert Morrison’s supposed boast to “…build the Conservatives out of London” by building new public housing in marginal Conservative seats.[citation needed]

    Immigration law may also be used to manipulate electoral demography. An example of this happened in Malaysia when immigrants from neighboring Philippines and Indonesia were given citizenship, together with voting rights, in order for a political party to “dominate” the state of Sabah in a controversial process referred to as Project IC.[7]

    A method of manipulating primary contests and other elections of party leaders is related to this. People who support one party may temporarily join another party in order to help elect a weak candidate for that party’s leadership, in the hope that they will be defeated by the leader of the party that they secretly support.

    The composition of an electorate may also be altered by disenfranchising some types of people, rendering them unable to vote. In some cases, this may be done at a legislative level, for example by passing a law banning prison inmates (or even former prison inmates), recent immigrants or members of a particular ethnic or religious group from voting, or by instituting a literacy or other test which members of some groups are more likely to fail. Since this is done by lawmakers, it cannot be election fraud, but may subvert the purposes of democracy. This is especially so if members of the disenfranchised group were particularly likely to vote a certain way.

    In some cases voters may be invalidly disenfranchised, which is true electoral fraud. For example a legitimate voter may be ‘accidentally’ removed from the electoral roll, making it difficult or impossible for the person to vote. Corrupt election officials may misuse voting regulations such as a literacy test or requirement for proof of identity or address in such a way as to make it difficult or impossible for their targets to cast a vote. If such practices discriminate against a religious or ethnic group, they may so distort the political process that the political order becomes grossly unrepresentative, as in the post-Reconstruction or Jim Crow era until the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

    Groups may also be disenfranchised by rules which make it impractical or impossible for them to cast a vote. For example, requiring people to vote within their electorate may disenfranchise serving military personnel, prison inmates, students, hospital patients or anyone else who cannot return to their homes. Polling can be set for inconvenient days such as midweek or on Holy Days (example: Sabbath or other holy days of a religious group whose teachings determine that voting is a prohibited on such a day) in order to make voting difficult for those studying or working away from home. Communities may also be effectively disenfranchised if polling places are not provided within reasonable proximity (rural communities are especially vulnerable to this) or situated in areas perceived by some voters as unsafe.

    A particular example of this strategy is the Canadian federal election of 1917, where the Union government passed the Military Voters Act and the Wartime Elections Act. The Military Voters Act permitted any active military personnel to vote by party only and allow that party to decide in which electoral district to place that vote. It also enfranchised women who were directly related or married to an active soldier. These groups were widely assumed to be disproportionately in favor of the Union government, as that party was campaigning in favor of conscription. The Wartime Elections Act, conversely, disenfranchised particular ethnic groups assumed to be disproportionately in favor of the opposition Liberal Party.

    In 2012, 10 American states passed laws requiring photo ID at the ballot box, citing protection against electoral fraud. However, a study by the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University Law School concluded that minorities, the poor and the elderly are less likely to have photo ID, and that such groups were more likely to live long distances from ID-issuing offices.[8] Additionally, partisan politics has been exposed as a major factor in the introduction of voter ID legislation, as such legislation would disenfranchise many people who vote for Democratic Party nominees, benefiting the Republican Party in elections.

    Voter intimidation involves putting undue pressure on a voter or group of voters so that they will vote a particular way, or not at all. Absentee and other remote voting can be more open to some forms of intimidation as the voter does not have the protection and privacy of the polling location. Intimidation can take a range of forms.

    Violence or the threat of violence: In its simplest form, voters from a particular demographic or known to support a particular party or candidate are directly threatened by supporters of another party or candidate or by those hired by them. In other cases, supporters of a particular party make it known that if a particular village or neighborhood is found to have voted the ‘wrong’ way, reprisals will be made against that community. Another method is to make a general threat of violence, for example a bomb threat which has the effect of closing a particular polling place, thus making it difficult for people in that area to vote.[9] One notable example of outright violence was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, where followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh deliberately contaminated salad bars in The Dalles, Oregon, in an attempt to weaken political opposition during county elections.

    Attacks on polling places: Polling places in an area known to support a particular party or candidate may be targeted for vandalism, destruction or threats, thus making it difficult or impossible for people in that area to vote.

    Legal threats: In this case voters will be made to believe, accurately or otherwise, that they are not legally entitled to vote, or that they are legally obliged to vote a particular way. Voters who are not confident about their entitlement to vote may also be intimidated by real or implied authority figures who suggest that those who vote when they are not entitled to will be imprisoned, deported or otherwise punished.[10][11] For example in 2004, in Wisconsin and elsewhere voters allegedly received flyers that said, “If you already voted in any election this year, you can’t vote in the Presidential Election”, implying that those who had voted in earlier primary elections were ineligible to vote. Also, “If anybody in your family has ever been found guilty of anything you can’t vote in the Presidential Election.” Finally, “If you violate any of these laws, you can get 10 years in prison and your children will be taken away from you.”[12][13] Another method, allegedly used in Cook County, Illinois in 2004, is to falsely tell particular people that they are not eligible to vote.[11]

    Economic threats: In company towns in which one company employs most of the working population, the company may threaten workers with disciplinary action if they do not vote the way their employer dictates. One method of doing this is the ‘shoe polish method’. This method entails coating the voting machine’s lever or button of the opposing candidate(s) with shoe polish. This method works when an employee of a company that orders him to vote a certain way votes contrary to those orders. After the voter exits the voting booth, a conspirator to the fraud (a precinct captain or other local person in collusion with the employee’s management) handshakes the voter. The conspirator, then, subtly checks the voter’s hands for any shoe polish or notes. If the conspirator finds shoe polish or notes in the voter’s hands, then that unfortunate voter gets fired or faces other unpleasant consequences.[citation needed]

    Vote buying[edit]

    The most famous episodes of vote buying came in 18th century England, when two or more rich aristocrats spent whatever money it took to win. The notorious “Spendthrift election” came in Northamptonshire in 1768, when three earls spent over ₤100,000 each to win a seat.[14]

    Voters may be given money or other rewards for voting in a particular way, or not voting. In some jurisdictions, the offer or giving of other rewards is referred to as “electoral treating”.[15] Vote buying may also be done indirectly, for example by paying clergymen to tell their parishioners to vote for a particular party or candidate. Vote buying is generally avoided by not providing a “receipt” for the counted vote, even if it’s technically possible to do so.[citation needed]

    Electoral treating remains legal in some jurisdictions, such as in the Seneca Nation of Indians.[16]

    People may distribute false or misleading information in order to affect the outcome of an election.[1] For example, in the Chilean Presidential election of 1970 the Central Intelligence Agency used “black propaganda”—materials purporting to be from various political parties—to sow discord between members of a coalition between socialists and communists.[17]

    Another way in which misinformation can be used is to give voters incorrect information about the time or place of polling, thus causing them to miss their chance to vote. The Democratic Party of Wisconsin alleged that Americans for Prosperity engaged in this when a flier printed in August 2011 gave an incorrect return date for absentee ballots – Americans for Prosperity alleged it was a misprint.[18][19][20] As part of the 2011 Canadian federal election voter suppression scandal, Elections Canada traced fraudulent phone calls telling voters that their polling stations had been moved to a telecommunications company which worked for the Conservative Party.[21] More recently in 2014, Americans for Prosperity were again accused of distributing voter misinformation, by mailing out incorrect or misleading information to hundreds of thousands of mailers which included the wrong deadline for voter registration and other inaccurate information.[22] Americans for Prosperity Deputy Director Donald Bryson claimed the mailings were a mistake and that they had not paid enough attention to detail.[23]
    Misleading or confusing ballot papers[edit]

    Ballot papers may be used to discourage votes for a particular party or candidate, using design or other features which confuse voters into voting for a different candidate. For example, in the 2000 U.S. presidential election, Florida’s butterfly ballot paper was criticized as confusing some voters into giving their vote to the wrong candidate. Ironically, however, the ballot was designed by a Democrat, the party most harmed by this design.[24] Poor or misleading design is not usually illegal and therefore not technically election fraud, but can subvert the principles of democracy.

    A similar approach has been used in Sweden, where a system with separate ballots for each party is used. Ballots from Sweden Democrats have there been mixed with ballots from the bigger Swedish Social Democratic Party, which used a very similar font for the party name written on the top of the ballot.

    Another method of confusing people into voting for a different candidate than they intended is to run candidates or create political parties with similar names or symbols as an existing candidate or party. The aim is that enough voters will be misled into voting for the false candidate or party to influence the results.[25] Such tactics may be particularly effective when a large proportion of voters have limited literacy in the language used on the ballot paper. Again, such tactics are usually not illegal but often work against the principles of democracy.

    Another way of possible electoral confusion, is multiple variations of voting by different electoral systems. This is unwittingly cause ballot papers to be invalid, if the wrong system is employed such as putting a first-past-the-post cross in a numbered single transferable vote ballot paper. For example in Scotland, there are four different voting systems employed. They are single transferable vote for local elections, additional member system for Scottish parliamentary elections, first-past-the-post for national elections & party list system in European elections.
    Ballot stuffing[edit]

    Transparent ballot box used in Russia to prevent election officials from pre-stuffing box with fake ballots.

    Ballot stuffing is when one person submits multiple ballots during a vote in which only one ballot per person is permitted. The name originates from the earliest days of this practice in which people literally did stuff more than one ballot in a ballot box at the same time.

    Detecting ballot-stuffing depends a great deal on how good the record-keeping is. Most election systems match the number of persons showing up to vote with the number of ballots cast, and/or preparing the forms so that they are difficult to fake. A common method still used in small village elections throughout the USA[citation needed] uses two ballot boxes and a single sheet of paper for a ballot. After marking the ballot, the sheet is folded in half, then torn with each part dropped in the corresponding ballot box. The number of marked ballots in one box will equal the number of ballot sheet headers in the other ballot box, thus preventing ballot stuffing. In short, successful ballot-stuffing usually requires the misconduct of genuine registered voters and/or elections personnel.

    Ballot-stuffing can be accomplished in a number of ways. Often, a ballot-stuffer casts votes on the behalf of people who did not show up to the polls (known as telegraphing); sometimes, votes are even cast by those who are long dead or fictitious characters in TV shows, books, and movies (known as padding). Both practices are also referred to as personation. In earlier societies[which?] with little paperwork, dead people were kept “alive” on paper for the purpose of ballot-stuffing. The family of the deceased often helped along, either to assist their party or for money.

    Ballot stuffing is possible with one version of the Sequoia touchscreen voting machine. It has a yellow button on the back side which when pressed allows repeated vote stuffing. By design, pressing the button triggers the emanation of two audible beeps.[26]
    Misrecording of votes[edit]

    Many elections feature multiple opportunities for unscrupulous officials or ‘helpers’ to record an elector’s vote differently from their intentions. Voters who require assistance to cast their votes are particularly vulnerable to having their votes stolen in this way. For example, a blind person or one who cannot read the language of the ballot paper may be told that they have voted for one party when in fact they have been led to vote for another. This is similar to the misuse of proxy votes; however in this case the voter will be under the impression that they have voted with the assistance of the other person, rather than having the other person voting on their behalf.

    Where votes are recorded through electronic or mechanical means, the voting machinery may be altered so that a vote intended for one candidate is recorded for another.
    Misuse of proxy votes[edit]

    Proxy voting is particularly vulnerable to election fraud, due to the amount of trust placed in the person who casts the vote. In several countries there have been allegations of retirement home residents being asked to fill out ‘absentee voter’ forms. When the forms are signed and gathered, they are then secretly rewritten as applications for proxy votes, naming party activists or their friends and relatives as the proxies. These people, unknown to the voter, then cast the vote for the party of their choice. This trick relies on elderly care home residents typically being absent-minded, or suffering from dementia. In the United Kingdom, this is known as ‘granny farming’ and has been restricted in recent years by a change in the law which prevents a single voter acting as a proxy for more than two non-family members therefore requiring more people to be involved in any fraud.
    Destruction or invalidation of ballots[edit]

    One of the simplest methods of electoral fraud is to simply destroy ballots for the ‘wrong’ candidate or party. This is unusual in functioning democracies, as it is difficult to do without attracting attention. However in a very close election it might be possible to destroy a very small number of ballot papers without detection, thereby changing the overall result. Blatant destruction of ballot papers can render an election invalid and force it to be re-run. If a party can improve its vote on the re-run election, it can benefit from such destruction as long as it is not linked to it.

    A more subtle, and easily achieved, method is to make it appear that the voter has spoiled his or her ballot, thus rendering it invalid. Typically this would be done by adding another mark to the paper, making it appear that the voter has voted for more candidates than they were entitled to. It would be difficult to do this to a large number of papers without detection, but in a close election may prove decisive.
    Tampering with electronic voting machines[edit]

    All voting systems face threats of some form of electoral fraud. The types of threats that affect voting machines can vary from other forms of voting systems, some threats may be prevented and others introduced.”Threat Analyses & Papers”. National Institute of Standards and Technology. October 7, 2005. Retrieved 5 March 2011.

    Some forms of electoral fraud specific to electronic voting machines are listed below. Recent research at Argonne National Laboratories demonstrates that if a malicious actor is able to gain physical access to a voting machine, it can be a simple process to manipulate certain electronic voting machines, such as the Diebold Accuvote TS, by inserting inexpensive, readily available electronic components inside the machine.[27][28]

    Tampering with the software of a voting machine to add malicious code altering vote totals or favor any candidate.
    Multiple groups have demonstrated this possibility.[29][30][31]
    Private companies manufacture these machines. Many companies will not allow public access or review of the machines source code, claiming fear of exposing trade secrets.[32]
    Tampering with the hardware of the voting machine to alter vote totals or favor any candidate.[30]
    Some of these machines require a smartcard to activate the machine and vote. However, a fraudulent smart card could attempt to gain access to vote multiple times.[33]
    Abusing the administrative access to the machine by election officials might also allow individuals to vote multiple times.
    Election results that are sent directly over the internet from a county count center to the state count center can be vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack, where they are diverted to an intermediate web site where the man in the middle flips the votes in favor of a certain candidate and then immediately forwards them on to the state count center. All votes sent over the internet violate chain of custody and hence should be avoided by driving or flying memory cards in locked metal containers from county count centers to the state count center. For purposes of getting quick preliminary statewide results on election night, encrypted votes can be sent over the internet, but final official results should be tabulated the next day only after the actual memory cards arrive in secure metal containers and are counted.[34]

    Vote fraud in legislature[edit]

    Vote fraud can also take place in legislatures. Some of the forms used in national elections can also be used in parliaments, particularly intimidation and vote-buying. Because of the much smaller number of voters, however, election fraud in legislatures is qualitatively different in many ways. Fewer people are needed to ‘swing’ the election, and therefore specific people can be targeted in ways impractical on a larger scale. For example, Adolf Hitler achieved his dictatorial powers due to the Enabling Act of 1933, and achieved the necessary two-thirds majority to pass the Act by arresting members of the opposition. Later, the Reichstag was packed with Nazi party members who voted for the Act’s renewal.

    In many legislatures, voting is public, in contrast to the secret ballot used in most modern public elections. This may make their elections more vulnerable to some forms of fraud, since a politician can be pressured by others who will know how he or she has voted. However, it may also protect against bribery and blackmail since the public and media will be aware if a politician votes in an unexpected way. Since voters and parties are entitled to pressure politicians to vote a particular way, the line between legitimate and fraudulent pressure is not always clear.

    As in public elections, proxy votes are particularly prone to fraud. In some systems, parties may vote on behalf of any member who is not present in parliament. This protects those people from missing out on voting if they are prevented from attending parliament, but also allows their party to prevent them from voting against its wishes. In some legislatures, proxy voting is not allowed, but politicians may rig voting buttons or otherwise illegally cast ‘ghost votes’ while absent.[35]

    The two main strategies for the prevention of electoral fraud in society are: 1) deterrence through consistent and effective prosecution; 2) Cultivation of mores that discourage corruption. The two main fraud prevention tactics, ironically, can be summarized as secrecy and openness. The secret ballot prevents many kinds of intimidation and vote selling, while transparency at all other levels of the electoral process prevents and detects most interference.

    The patterns of conventional behavior in a society or mores are an effective means for preventing electoral fraud and corruption in general. A good example is Sweden, where the culture has a strong tendency toward positive values,[neutrality is disputed] resulting in a low incidence of political corruption.[36] Until recently Canada had a similar reputation, but the In and Out scandal of 2008 and the Robocall scandal of 2011 has tarnished Canada’s electoral integrity.

    An advantage of cultivating positive mores as a prevention strategy is that it is effective across all electoral systems and devices. A disadvantage is that it makes other prevention and detection efforts more difficult to implement because members of society generally have more trust and less of a sense for fraudulent methods.
    Secret ballot[edit]

    Main article: Secret ballot

    The secret ballot, in which only the voter knows how individuals have voted, is a crucial part of ensuring free and fair elections through preventing voter intimidation or retribution. Although it was sometimes practiced in ancient Greece and was a part of the French Constitution of 1795, it only became common in the nineteenth century. Secret balloting appears to have been first implemented in the former British colony—now an Australian state—of Tasmania on 7 February 1856. By the turn of the century the practice had spread to most Western democracies. Before this, it was common for candidates to intimidate or bribe voters, as they would always know who had voted which way.

    Most methods of preventing electoral fraud involve making the election process completely transparent to all voters, from nomination of candidates through casting of the votes and tabulation.[37] A key feature in ensuring the integrity of any part of the electoral process is a strict chain of custody.

    To prevent fraud in central tabulation, there has to be a public list of the results from every single polling place. This is the only way for voters to prove that the results they witnessed in their election office are correctly incorporated into the totals.

    End-to-end auditable voting systems provide voters with a receipt to allow them to verify their vote was cast correctly, and an audit mechanism to verify that the results were tabulated correctly and all votes were cast by valid voters. However, the ballot receipt does not permit voters to prove to others how they voted, since this would open the door towards forced voting and blackmail. End-to-end systems include Punchscan and Scantegrity, the latter being an add-on to optical scan systems instead of a replacement.

    In many cases, election observers are used to help prevent fraud and assure voters that the election is fair. International observers (bilateral and multilateral) may be invited to observe the elections (examples include election observation by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union election observation missions, observation missions of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as international observation organized by NGOs, such as CIS-EMO, European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO), etc.). Some countries also invite foreign observers (i.e. bi-lateral observation, as opposed to multi-lateral observation by international observers).

    In addition, national legislatures of countries often permit domestic observation. Domestic election observers can be either partisan (i.e. representing interests of one or a group of election contestants) or non-partisan (usually done by civil society groups). Legislations of different countries permit various forms and extents of international and domestic election observation.

    Election observation is also prescribed by various international legal instruments. For example, paragraph 8 of the 1990 Copenhagen Document states that “The [OSCE] participating States consider that the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking place. They therefore invite observers from any other CSCE participating States and any appropriate private institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law. They will also endeavor to facilitate similar access for election proceedings held below the national level. Such observers will undertake not to interfere in the electoral proceedings”.

    Critics note that observers cannot spot certain types of election fraud like targeted voter suppression or manipulated software of voting machines.
    Statistical indicators[edit]

    Various forms of statistics can be indicators for election fraud e.g. exit polls which diverge from the final results. Well-conducted exit polls serve as a deterrent to electoral fraud. However, exit polls are still notoriously imprecise. For instance, in the Czech Republic, some voters are afraid or ashamed to admit that they voted for the Communist Party (exit polls in 2002 gave the Communist party 2-3 percentage points less than the actual result).

    When elections are marred by ballot-box stuffing (e.g., the Armenian presidential elections of 1996 and 1998), the affected polling stations will show abnormally high voter turnouts with results favoring a single candidate. By graphing the number of votes against turnout percentage (i.e., aggregating polling stations results within a given turnout range), the divergence from bell-curve distribution gives an indication of the extent of the fraud. Stuffing votes in favor of a single candidate affects votes vs. turnout distributions for that candidate and other candidates differently; this difference could be used to quantitatively assess the amount of votes stuffed. Also, these distributions sometimes exhibit spikes at round-number turnout percentage values.[38][39][40] High numbers of invalid ballots, overvoting or undervoting are other potential indicators.

    In countries with strong laws and effective legal systems, lawsuits can be brought against those who have allegedly committed fraud; but the deterrent of legal prosecution would not be enough. Although the penalties for getting caught may be severe, the rewards for succeeding are likely to be worth the risk. The rewards range from benefits in contracting to total control of a country.

    In Germany there are currently calls for reform of these laws because lawsuits can be and are usually prolonged by the newly elected Bundestag.

    In the United States one such case was in Pennsylvania where Bill Stinson won an election based on fraudulent absentee ballots. The courts ruled that his opponent be seated in the state Senate as a result.[41]

    In the Philippines, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was arrested in 2011 following the filing of criminal charges against her for electoral sabotage, in connection with the Philippine general election, 2007. She was accused of conspiring with election officials to ensure the victory of her party’s senatorial slate in the province of Maguindanao, through the tampering of election returns.[42]
    Voting machine integrity[edit]

    One method for verifying voting machine accuracy is Parallel Testing, the process of using an independent set of results compared against the original machine results. Parallel testing can be done prior to or during an election. During an election, one form of parallel testing is the VVPAT. This method is only effective if statistically significant numbers of voters verify that their intended vote matches both the electronic and paper votes.

    On election day, a statistically significant number of voting machines can be randomly selected from polling locations and used for testing. This can be used to detect potential fraud or malfunction unless manipulated software would only start to cheat after a certain event like a voter pressing a special key combination (Or a machine might cheat only if someone doesn’t perform the combination, which requires more insider access but fewer voters).

    Another form of testing is Logic & Accuracy Testing (L&A), pre-election testing of voting machines using test votes to determine if they are functioning correctly.

    Another method to insure the integrity of electronic voting machines is independent software verification and certification.[37] Once software is certified, code signing can insure the software certified is identical to that which is used on election day. Some argue certification would be more effective if voting machine software was publicly available or open source.

    Certification and testing processes conducted publicly and with oversight from interested parties can promote transparency in the election process. The integrity of those conducting testing can be questioned.

    Testing and certification can prevent voting machines from being a black box where voters can not be sure that counting inside is done as intended.[37]

    One method that people have argued would help prevent these machines from being tampered with would be for the companies that produce the machines to share the source code, which displays and captures the ballots, with computer scientists. This would allow external sources to make sure that the machines are working correctly.[32]

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Lok Sabha 2024: Did the government deliver on promises of jobs and employment?

As Mumbai, Thane, Palghar and Kalyan get ready to vote on May 20th, a look at the government's performance on promises of jobs and employment.

In the 4th phase of the Lok Sabha Elections, among other regions in India, six constituencies of Mumbai (city and suburban), Thane, Kalyan and Palghar will vote on May 20th. As the campaign peaks and promises fly from every leader and candidate, voters are getting ready to cast their precious vote. Making an informed choice, is the first step towards strengthening democracy and ensuring sustainable and equitable life for all. Mumbai Votes, a not-for-profit, independent info-bank, conducts research on election manifestos, party promises, their implementation over the years and sector wise performance of different political parties. In the run up…